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Abstract: Money market benchmarks are important indicators for economic agents. They 
are also crucial for central banks in assessing the functioning of the interest rate channel 
of the monetary transmission mechanism. However, whereas the unsecured interbank 
money market conventionally has been seen as encompassing instruments with maturities 
up to one year, it appears as if it consists of two markets. The ultra-short-term money 
market (typically just one day) is large, liquid, and traded regularly. The term money market 
(one, three or six months), by contrast, is small, illiquid and rarely traded. This article 
explores the feasibility of creating and maintaining a money market benchmark which does 
not represent an underlying liquid market. From a sociological perspective, it addresses 
two critical aspects of financial benchmarks: (1) that they are related to but separate and 
distinct from the objects determining them and (2) that they are measurements and as 
such cannot be bought or sold (Stenfors and Lindo 2018). By doing so, the article also 
reflects upon the desire by financial regulators following the LIBOR manipulation scandal 
to replace estimation-based by transaction-based benchmarks, as well as some challenges 
and contradictions in conventional central banking theory.
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Money market benchmarks are important indicators for economic agents. They act as 
reference rates and facilitate risk management through the pricing of financial products such 
as floating-rate loans, mortgages, and derivatives. They are also used to measure and compare 
investment returns and funding costs. From a policy perspective, money market benchmarks 
are crucial for central banks in assessing the functioning of the interest rate channel of the 
monetary transmission mechanism (European Central Bank 2020a). The logic underpinning 
the process by how monetary policy decisions affect interest rates and expectations has 
become widely accepted in mainstream economic theory and institutionalized within 
policymaking. It has also become synonymous with the through-process of an increasing 
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number of inflation-targeting regimes, lately expanded to include developing countries with 
limited or highly illiquid domestic money markets.1 
The first stage of the monetary transmission mechanism involves borrowing and 
lending among banks. Money market benchmarks are assumed to reflect this activity, namely, 
banks’ funding wholesale costs (Hou and Skeie 2014). A significant number of financial 
instruments are linked to the unsecured interbank term markets due to, in part, their 
historical emergence as they were perceived as good proxies for bank funding costs. With 
financial contracts of more than USD 400 trillion referenced to it, the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) is the world’s most widely used financial benchmark (Schrimf and 
Sushko 2019).
However, money market benchmarks started to receive considerable attention following 
the structural changes in the underlying markets after the 2007–2008 global financial crisis 
and the 2012 LIBOR manipulation scandal. LIBOR and similar benchmarks are determined 
using a poll of selected banks that submit estimated interest rates at which they could borrow 
funds from the unsecured money market. The rates submitted by a panel of banks are not 
anchored on actual transactions but are judgment-based. This provided incentives for banks 
to manipulate their interest rate submissions. Banks were underreporting their interest rate 
submissions to signal their financial strength and to profit from their large derivative positions 
(BIS 2013; Duffie and Stein 2015). In this regard, LIBOR was deemed “unrepresentative” of 
the money market benchmark.
According to IOSCO (2013), the attributes of a good benchmark include robustness 
and resilience, reliability, usability, transparency and representativeness. Whereas all these 
attributes are essential, representativeness is arguably the most fundamental. It refers to the 
fact that interest rate benchmarks should reflect the economic realities of the underlying 
market (Brousseau, Chailloux, and Durré 2013). A reflection of economic realities entail that 
a money market benchmark must mirror a) the cost of actual transactions in the underlying 
market and b) the source of funds for financial intermediaries (BIS 2013). The first has 
been regarded as the most significant criterion for assessing representativeness by financial 
regulators (Schrimpf and Sushko 2019). A money market benchmark that is not based on 
actual market transactions is not representative and, therefore, flawed. 
The End of LIBOR
LIBOR’s de-facto death sentence was delivered by Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the 
FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) on July 27, 2017 (FCA 2017). The UK financial 
regulator stated that “the underlying market that LIBOR seeks to measure—the market for 
unsecured wholesale term lending to banks—is no longer sufficiently active.” He continued 
by questioning the sustainability of LIBOR: “If an active market does not exist, how can even 
the best run benchmark measure it?”
A similar picture had been revealed in other major markets too—including the United 
States. According to data from the European Central Bank (2020b), the unsecured overnight 
segment accounts for over 98% of the borrowing volume in the euro area. Just around 1% of 
the turnover takes place in maturities longer than one week.2 However, Alexis Stenfors and 
1 However, the adoption of inflation-targeting by developing and emerging countries has been critiqued on a 
number of issues (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2017; Argitis 2008).
2 According to the Bank of England (2020b), the transaction-based submissions in the three-month LIBOR 
dropped to zero during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. More than 50% of the thirty-five published 
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Duncan Lindo (2018) suggest that the lack of transactions in the term money markets is not 
limited to crises and turbulent episodes. Instead, they argue that a gradual decline started 
well before the financial crisis of 2007–2008. 
Problematically, while general information is available on unsecured money markets 
activity, granular data on interbank markets is not readily available to the public. Fortunately, 
we have obtained a unique dataset from the Bank of Zambia to illuminate more on these 
markets. Zambia is considering the introduction of term interbank reference rates. Robust 
benchmarks are essential for Zambia, considering that it is one of the countries that has 
institutionalized monetary transmission mechanism in its policies. Zambia revised its 
monetary policy operations framework in April 2012 as it transitions towards full-fledged 
inflation targeting. The data constitutes every single domestic interbank transaction 
including trading volumes, interest rates, counterparties and collateral type from April 2012 
to December 2019. To illuminate the money market specificities in the Zambian unsecured 
interbank money market, we use traditional liquidity metrics such as the number and volume 
of trades as proxies (Sarr and Lybek 2002). 
Figure 1. Cumulative Turnover in the Zambian Unsecured Interbank Money Market (in 
millions of kwacha)
Sources: Bank of Zambia and authors’ calculations.
Figure 1 shows the turnover in the Zambian unsecured interbank money market by 
maturity segment between 2012 and 2019. 
As can be seen, the market has grown from less than 5 billion Zambian kwacha in 
2012 to over 20 billion in 2019. In U.S. dollar terms, however, the change is somewhat less 
LIBOR rates across all currencies did not have transaction-based submissions at all.
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pronounced: a doubling to approximately 1.5 billion U.S. dollars in 2019. Nonetheless, the 
vast bulk of the turnover (98.2 percent) is made up of trades maturity in seven days or less. 
Money market turnover involving maturities longer than thirty-one days account for just 0.1 
percent of the whole market.
A similar picture is observed when market liquidity is measured by the number of 
trades per maturity category for the same period (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Total Number of Trades per Maturity Category in the Zambian Unsecured 
Interbank Market, April 2012–December 2019
Sources: Bank of Zambia and authors’ calculations.
During the period studied, the number of interbank trades has ranged between 429 (in 
2018) and 922 (in 2016). Notably, again, is the almost complete absence of deals involving 
maturities longer than seven days. In 2013 and 2016, there were no transactions at all above 
30 days. Indeed, trades in the two longest categories (91–180 and 181–365 days) were only 
reported in 2018. In sum, notable is that liquidity is limited to the ultra-short-term interbank 
market (one to seven days) and very limited in the term interbank market. 
To further demonstrate the differences between the ultra-short-term and the other 
maturity categories, the percentage of days with observed trading activity across maturity 
categories is presented in Figure 3. 
Notable is that while the ultra-short-term segment has observed trading volume over 
95 percent of the time, the term interbank market is characterized by very low percentages 
(below 10 percent). 
The Zambian money market is minuscule in comparison with the developed markets 
that underpin LIBOR. However, there are also striking similarities echoing the observations 
made by central banks and regulators in Europe and the United States. Put together; the 
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empirical evidence points to a clear distinction between the “ultra-short-term” and the 
“term” money market. It appears as if the unsecured interbank money market consists of two
markets. The ultra-short-term money market (up to one week, but typically just one day) is 
relatively large, liquid and traded regularly. The term money market (beyond one week, but 
generally conceptualized as one, three or six months), however, is small, illiquid and rarely 
traded. 












1-7 days 8-30 days 31-90 days 91-180 days 181-365 days
Sources: Bank of Zambia and authors’ calculations. Note: The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of business days 
with observed trading activity by the total number of business days in the sample period.
Maturity and Representativeness 
The distinction between the ultra-short-term money market and term money market is 
paramount because it highlights the issue of “representativeness.” Money market benchmarks 
seem to be representative of money markets as a whole, but not when distinguishing it 
according to the term to maturity. Benchmarks, such as LIBOR, almost exclusively refer 
to the term money market (i.e., the Eurodollar market), whereas practically all activity takes 
place in the ultra-short-term market. 
Treating the ultra-short-term money market and term money market as synonyms is 
practical and convenient. After all, they both represent the “money market.” For instance, in 
“The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets,” Frederic S. Mishkin (2019, 77) 
defines the money market as a market in which “only short-term debt instruments (generally 
those with original maturity terms of less than one year) are traded.” The author is not only 
Professor and a former member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
but also the author of one of the widely read academic textbooks on the topic. Likewise, 
in “The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities,” Frank J. Fabozzi (2001, 250), states that 
“money market instruments are debt obligations that at issuance have a maturity of one year 
or less.” Written by another authority, the classic 1,300-page handbook can be found across 
trading floors around the world. Thus, in terms of their term to maturity, money market 
instruments have tended to be defined and distinguished in relation to the long-term capital 
market, with maturities beyond one year. As Thorstein Veblen ([1899] 1957, 145) states, “So 
soon as a given proclivity or a given point of view has won acceptance as an authoritative 
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standard or norm of life it will react upon the character of the members of the society which 
has accepted it as a norm. It will, to some extent, shape their habits of thought.” 
Human decisions are based on “assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue 
indefinitely — except when we have specific reasons to expect a change” (Keynes 1936, 152). 
This means people tend to assume that the accepted standard or convention is correct, 
however arrived at. The money market definition has been accepted as a standard and 
therefore influenced people’s thoughts, habits and institutions over time. Fundamentally, 
however, a money market benchmark needs to represent the underlying money market. 
Otherwise, it is not fit for purpose. 
The money market we typically refer to today emerged with the innovation of the 
Eurodollar market in 1957. This market multiplied and spurred a range of new financial 
innovations in the form of money market benchmarks (e.g., LIBOR), new financial 
instruments (e.g., Eurobonds and derivatives linked to LIBOR) and other banking activities. 
Money market benchmarks did not “evolve” from money markets. They were invented in 
the 1980s for a specific purpose: to enable the innovation and growth of new forms of 
banking activities. The derivatives market, in particular, expanded rapidly with the advent 
of securitization and the 1988 Basel Accord regulatory changes, which favored the growth 
of off-balance sheet items such as derivatives and penalized on-balance sheet items—and 
Eurodollar deposits, in particular (Stenfors and Lindo 2018).
Gradually, banks began to shift away from the term money market towards financial 
derivatives and foreign exchange swaps (Stenfors 2019). However, although the overall money 
market continued to grow, maturities became, on balance, shorter. As Alexis Stenfors and 
Duncan Lindo (2018, 182) argue, this market “had little to do with interest rate expectations 
and credit and more to do with daily funding and liquidity requirements to square up the 
bank balances.” Indeed, trading in the ultra-short-term interbank money market category is 
mainly a liquidity management operation. Financial intermediaries use this segment of the 
market to square off their long or short positions, which arise from their daily obligations 
and inflows. The daily obligations include, among others, customer payments and central 
bank statutory reserve requirements (SRRs). Banks are required by central banks to hold a 
certain portion of their deposit liabilities with the central bank as SRRs for prudential and 
monetary policy purposes.3 Long positions, on the other hand, arise from unexpected cash 
inflows. Thus, the term and ultra-term money markets have diverged over time. However, 
whereas their uses have become vastly different in practice, the two maturity segments 
continue to be treated as one single market in theory and by definition. This is in line with 
Veblen ([1899] 1957, 133) as he states, “institutions are products of the past process, are 
adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore never in full accord with the requirements 
of the present.” In this case, institutions which refer to “habits of thought” have continued 
to treat the two maturity segments as one single market despite their uses becoming vastly 
different in practice. 
The money market definition or theory has “performed” the illusion that the money 
market is a “unit” representative of “one market.” In this case as Donald MacKenzie and 
Yuval Millo (2003, 108) state: “Economics does not describe an existing external “economy,” 
but brings that economy into being: economics performs the economy, creating the 
phenomena it describes.” In this context, performativity entails that economics “does things, 
3 For example, Zambia‘s minimum SRR is currently at 9 percent and is applied on commercial banks’ 
domestic and foreign currency liabilities (Bank of Zambia 2019).
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rather than simply describing (with greater or lesser degrees of accuracy) an external reality” 
(MacKenzie, Muniesa and Sui 2007, 55). The money market definition or theory seems 
to have become distant from what it intends to “represent.” If economic theory does not 
represent the marketplace, striving to make generalizations can result in detached theory 
from reality (Callon 1998).
This phenomenon extends to a wide range of financial instruments, markets, and 
institutions and processes. Alexis Stenfors and Duncan Lindo (2018) show how the 
evolution of the financial derivatives market helped to create an illusion that money markets 
were synonymous with money market benchmarks. This led individuals, corporates and 
policymakers to make decisions which were based upon the assumption that the benchmark 
was a market in itself. However, benchmarks, indices, and measurements cannot be bought 
and sold. Only contracts referring to them can. Further, Alexis Stenfors and Masayuki Susai 
illustrate how the conventional usage of specific quantitative metrics serves to overestimate 
the competitiveness and liquidity of foreign exchange markets (Stenfors, 2018; Stenfors and 
Susai 2018). Other studies demonstrate how the prominent application of mathematical 
equations in finance has suppressed the questioning of their underlying assumptions—and 
thereby led to distorted assessments about opportunities and risks in markets (MacKenzie 
and Millo 2013; Stenfors 2019; Chatziantoniou, Gabauer, and Stenfors 2020). Seen through 
this lens, the detachment of theory from reality seems to have created a false perception and 
reinforced an illusion of “one” representative money market.
Beyond LIBOR
The search for new benchmarks to replace LIBOR suggest that old habits have come under 
threat. Indeed, to ensure representativeness, financial market regulators have recommended 
a shift toward transaction-based reference rates supported by sufficient liquidity in underlying 
markets (BIS 2013; IOSCO 2013). In this regard, work is already underway in jurisdictions 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom to shift towards financial benchmarks 
anchored on actual transactions (Financial Stability Board 2019). Indeed, to replace the U.S. 
dollar LIBOR, U.S. authorities have selected the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR), 
which measures the cost of overnight cash transactions collateralized by Treasury securities 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2020). The British pound LIBOR will be replaced by 
the Sterling Overnight Interbank Average (SONIA), which is an average based on overnight 
unsecured transactions in British pounds (Bank of England 2020a). 
However, evidence points to the fact that the overnight market, which is large and liquid, 
can only represent overnight benchmarks. In contrast, illiquid tenors, such as three-month 
and six-month, can only be associated with the three-month and six-month reference rates, 
respectively. To replicate term LIBORs, the Alternative Reference Rates Committee (2019) 
provides recommendations on how overnight risk-free rates such as SOFR can be used to 
calculate term rates using two conventions, namely “in advance” or “in arrears.” The former 
uses historical data and compounds the overnight market and obtains a rate which is known 
upfront for the financial contract. The drawback of this rate is that it does not represent 
underlying conditions of the current period. The “arrears” convention attempts to address 
this issue by accruing interest in the interest period. However, while both mathematical 
methods of compounding overnight rates are useful, they are only representative of overnight 
markets and reinforce the “illusion” of representativeness in term money markets.
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Replacing an old benchmark with another does not pose a threat to the derivatives 
market as such, despite complex novation processes, legal challenges, and practical challenges 
in creating new instruments and markets. Indeed, the derivatives market has continued to 
grow despite a gradual erosion of the term money market (Stenfors and Lindo 2018). The 
death of LIBOR will automatically lead to the disappearance of derivatives linked to it. 
However, new benchmarks and derivatives referencing these will be created to replace them.
Nonetheless, the transition away from estimation-based based benchmarks representing 
a market which no longer exists will pose challenges for the logic of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Central banks and banks borrow and lend to each other in the overnight 
market, but if there is no market representing borrowing and lending beyond just a few days, 
how can the effectiveness of policymaking be assessed? Perhaps more importantly, how can 
strains in the financial system be accurately and reliably observed? This is critical, especially 
for developing economies with less liquid markets that have institutionalized the monetary 
transmission mechanism in their inflation-targeting policies. 
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